United We Vote by Eguia, Jon X.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
UNITED WE VOTE
Jon X. Eguia
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1208
December 2004
United We Vote∗
Jon X. Eguia †
January 11, 2005
Abstract
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents in a larger
electorate can obtain by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast
them all in one direction. We show under which conditions an agent will
benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, whether being part of it or
stepping out is most advantageous for an individual agent and what are
the diﬀerent optimal internal voting rules to aggregate preferences within
the coalition.
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1 Introduction
Individuals often form groups to further their goals. Acting as a team enables
them to obtain what perhaps they could not attain working alone. From the
pack of wolves hunting together to the complexities of the International Space
Station, pooling resources and eﬀort is advantageous. Coalitions, teams, al-
liances, groups are constantly formed and we see them operate in all fields of
human life.
However, despite the advantages of collaboration, alliances are often broken,
groups are dissolved, coalitions split, or fail to be formed in the first place. Any
union of heterogeneous agents may at times fail to act to the benefit of some
of its members. Individual freedom of action is partially curtailed by joining a
group and committing to follow its rules. This creates an incentive to abandon
the group and proceed alone in a diﬀerent course of action. There is a trade
oﬀ between the furthered chances group-action enables, and the sacrifice of
individual freedom involved in the process of forming a group.
In this paper we examine such trade-oﬀ in the context of political competition
between agents who know each other and can communicate to form a coalition.
Several non-cooperative theories of coalition formation with economic ap-
plications are surveyed in Carraro [4]. Here we study coalition formation in a
political setting in which agents wish to win an electoral vote: Agents coalesce
because doing so increases the probability of getting the outcome they want in
the election.
We draw inspiration from two examples: One is a legislature composed of
independent politicians each with their own individual policy preferences. A
group of these politicians can agree to form a political party. Members of a
party vote on the platform the party will stand for and then party discipline
will force all members to vote for the party’s platform in the legislature. A
politician joins a party with the hope that his preferences become the platform
of the party and thus carry wider support. On the other hand, party discipline
would force him to cast votes against his wishes if these don’t become part of
the party platform.
A second one is international politics: About 200 sovereign nations are en-
gaged in constant interaction. Most countries may find that their influence in
the outcome of the international decision making process is marginal or negli-
gible and their chances of getting their desired outcome are not too high. For
instance, how likely is it that [name a country out of the G-8 here] sees its
favorite candidate becoming the next president of the IMF or the UN? Maybe
forming a cohesive coalition to speak with a single voice in the world arena, a
group of countries that were individually neglected can gain some significant
leverage to get political outcomes closer to their wishes.
This is not only a theoretical possibility, but a very real one, at the heart
of the Non-Aligned-Countries movement created in the Sixties, which grouped
dozens of poor, former colonial countries trying to gain some influence aside of
the American-led Western nations and the Communist camp. An arguably more
successful venture in the same lines was the European Economic Community,
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which along other goals, shaped a common trade policy for its members.
We can imagine a coalition of countries facing a constitutional decision:
Whether or not to unify their foreign policies and mold them into a common po-
sition, committing and binding themselves to support the coalition’s, or Union’s,
future policies. Costs and benefits must be weighted beforehand, for we assume
that the Union process is irreversible (the decision might involve transferring
some crucial resources, or the control of the armed forces to a central or federal
power).
A crucial problem with the project is the design of the common position:
Each country knows what it wants and it also knows that a coalition of nations
will have a better chance of being granted its wishes than a single country. Thus
there is an incentive to form such coalition. But, if all its members actually have
diﬀerent goals, what is the coalition going to stand for?
The coalition requires to adopt an internal decision-making rule to aggregate
the preferences of its members. Buchanan and Tullock [3] praise the virtues of
unanimity, both as Constitutional rule (all members have to agree to join a
Union) and as internal voting rule for the coalition or Union (the Union only
acts collectively if all members agree on some course of action; otherwise each
member can pursue its own policies). Barberá and Jackson [1] let agents choose
among diﬀerent rules, and they define "self-stable" voting rules as those that
will not be beaten by any other rule if the given voting rule is used to choose
among rules. We let unanimity be the Constitutional rule used to choose among
rules, and we show that in most cases agents will prefer to choose some other
rule as internal decision-making rule.
Maggi and Morelli’s [11] study self-enforcing rules to determine whether
collective action will be taken or not by a group of agents that requires each
and every agent to participate in the collective eﬀort. Our model can also be seen
as a collective action problem where the collective action is to coordinate the
disparate voting intentions into a unified voting behavior, to the advantage of
the majority of the members of the voting coalition thus formed. A substantial
distinction is that Maggi and Morelli consider only an homogeneous society in
which agents are ex-ante identical, whereas we study the case with diﬀerent ex-
ante types. In heterogeneous coalitions, we find out that supermajority internal
voting rules are optimal, whereas in Maggi and Morelli’s setting no other internal
rule but simple majority or unanimity is ever optimal.
A diﬀerent approach to coalition formation comes from the voting power lit-
erature in the work of Gelman [8], who concentrates on the probability of casting
a decisive vote in an election and the eﬀect of coalitions over such probability.
We focus on the probability of getting the desired outcome out of the election,
not on the probability of casting a decisive vote, and we want to analyze the po-
tential benefits of forming a voting bloc, coalescing with other agents to cast all
votes in the same direction. Gelman works with a random voter model in which
the probability of voting "yes" is one half for every agent. Our model develops
one of the extensions mentioned in his paper by considering heterogeneity of
types.
This responds to a diﬀerent focus over a similar question: Gelman focuses on
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"a dynamic view of coalitions in which groups of voters choose of their own will
to form and disband coalitions in a continuing struggle to maintain their voting
power", we care about how the existence of a single coalition that forms a voting
bloc will aﬀect the degree of satisfaction of its members, how the heterogeneity
of such members may aﬀect their satisfaction resulting from forming the voting
bloc and which internal voting rules in the coalition may make the voting bloc
satisfactory for a broader range of parameters.
We believe these theoretical questions are particularly relevant to the ongoing
debates about the need or desire for a common foreign policy in the EU, a
purpose that was first vaguely stated in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), but that
has been recently the subject of much deeper debates and controversy during
the negotiations towards a Constitution (started in 2002) and will probably
continue to be in the European political agenda for years to come. Therefore,
we will frequently refer to the EU as a motivating example along our exposition.
After introducing the model and showing that there is a surplus to be gained
by forming a voting bloc in Section 2, in Section 3 we ask whether the formation
of the voting bloc will benefit every member of the coalition, and we find this to
be more likely if the voting bloc uses a supermajority internal voting rule than
if it uses simple majority. In Section 4 we study an "opt-out" rule that allows
one agent to stay out of the voting bloc and we discuss under what conditions
introducing such a rule will benefit all the members of the coalition. In Section 5
we conclude and propose a future agenda of research and an Appendix contains
algebraic calculations and proofs.
2 The Model. Gains from forming a Voting
Bloc.
We consider a society formed by M +N + 1 agents, where M and N are even.
These agents (legislators, countries, etc.) face a binary decision: Either to keep
the status quo, or to vote for an alternative a to replace it. All agents are called
to vote either for a (yes), or against a (no). If the number of favorable votes is
equal or higher than a threshold T, then a is implemented.
Each agent strictly prefers either the status quo or the alternative a, and
we assume no intensity on preferences. Preferences over lotteries will simply be
determined in favor of the lottery that assigns the higher weight to the preferred
alternative.
M agents lack coordination powers and will thus vote individually. The
remaining N + 1 agents can coordinate among themselves and may at wish
form a voting bloc. We will call this set of agents the coalition C.
If each and everyone of its members agrees to do so, coalition C forms a vot-
ing bloc. In this case coalition C will hold an internal meeting to predetermine
its voting behavior in the general vote. In the internal meeting, all members of
the coalition will vote yes or no according to their preferences for or against a.
Then:
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1. If the majority in this internal vote has strictly more than t(N +1) votes,
where t ∈ [12 ,
N
N+1 ], then the majority prevails and all members of coalition C
will vote as a bloc in the general election casting N + 1 votes according to the
preferences (either yes or no) of the majority of the coalition. The outcome of
the coalitional internal meeting is binding and the N + 1 agents cannot fail to
act according to this collectively decided voting behavior.
2. If the majority gathers no more than t(N + 1) votes in the internal vote,
then the coalition fails to act as a bloc in the general election and each member
is free to vote according to individual preferences.
Note that threshold t defines the rule used by the coalition to decide whether
or not it will act as a bloc rolling its internal minorities. A threshold t ∈ [12 ,
1
2 +
1
N+1) corresponds to simple majority, t ∈ [
1
2 +
1
N+1 ,
N
N+1 ) to a supermajority
and t = NN+1 to unanimity.
Forming a voting bloc with unanimity as internal voting rule is in essence
identical to not forming a voting bloc, for the coalition will only cast its votes
as a bloc if all its members share the same preference, in which case votes will
be cast as they would in the absence of a voting bloc.
If the coalition does not form a voting bloc, then all the member of the coali-
tion will vote according to their individual preferences in the general election.
Coalition members decide to form or not a voting bloc with a t−majority
internal voting rule before the alternative a is specified, so agents do not know
if they will prefer alternative a or the status quo. Agents have no power over
the specification of alternative a, which comes exogenously.
Every agent i has a type pi, which is the probability that agent i will prefer
alternative a to the status quo, once alternative a is revealed. This type can
be interpreted as a propensity for change, or as a displeasure with the status
quo in general. Types are common knowledge, and so are true preferences once
agents learn what the alternative a is.
Each realization of preferences is independent from the others, so once al-
ternative a is revealed, each of possibly many agents with a type po has an
independent probability po of supporting alternative a and typically several of
them will end up supporting a, whereas some others will prefer the status quo.
If the coalition forms a voting bloc, in the internal vote voting will be sincere
and there will be no abstention. With simple majority as internal decision
making rule, if the number of yes votes surpasses the number of negative ones,
then the whole coalition (now a voting bloc) will cast a total of (N+1) yes votes
in the general vote which includes all agents in the society. If the number of
no votes surpasses the number of favorable ones, then the coalition accordingly
votes as a bloc casting (N + 1) no votes in the general vote.
The voting bloc behavior we have described consists on rolling internal mi-
norities to present a common front in the general vote, strengthening the posi-
tion of the coalition’s majority with the minority votes which are "converted"
or "swayed" to the majoritarian camp, increasing the chances of eventually get-
ting the outcome the majority wishes (of course, in doing so the probability of
getting what the minority wishes decreases).
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Proposition 1 Let type pi ∈ (0, 1) for each agent i in the society. Then, for
any N ≥ 2 (number of agents in the coalition), M ≥ 2 (number of agents not
in the coalition), and T (threshold to accept alternative a), a coalition of N +1
members strictly increases the aggregated expected utility of its members by form-
ing a voting bloc with either simple majority or any supermajority as internal
voting rule. Simple majority rule is the internal voting rule that maximizes the
aggregated expected utility of the members of the voting bloc.
The proof is straightforward. We oﬀer a sketch here and details in the
Appendix.
Forming a voting bloc only has an eﬀect in utilities if the formation of a
bloc and the subsequent rolling of minority votes within the coalition alters the
outcome of the general vote. If so, every member of the coalition who is in
the coalitional majority benefits from the voting bloc formation, at the cost of
every voter in the minority. Since the majority is by definition bigger than the
minority, there are more members benefiting than suﬀering from the bloc, and
since the intensity of preferences is set to be equal for every member, in the
aggregate forming a voting bloc generates a surplus of utility for the coalition.
Any other rule that in some cases fails to roll a minority is giving away this net
gain in utility and therefore underperforms in comparison to simple majority in
terms of aggregated gains in utility.
It follows from Proposition 1 that if all the members of the coalition share a
common type, then forming a voting bloc increases the utility of every member
in the coalition and therefore an homogeneous coalition of agents who have a
same type should always form a voting bloc with simple majority as internal
voting rule to maximize their probability of winning the final vote in a larger
electorate. Also from Proposition 1, we derive the following Corollary
Corollary 1 If all but one of the members of the coalition share a common
type, all the homogeneous members benefit from the formation of a voting bloc.
Proof. Let pj = ph ∀j, h ∈ C\i and let pi 6= pj . Then if member i is in the rolled
minority, more of the homogeneous members are in the majority benefiting from
the rolling of votes the voting bloc imposes than in the hurt minority, thus in
the aggregate the homogeneous members strictly benefit from the bloc.
If member i is in the majority, there are at least the same number of ho-
mogeneous members in the majority as in the minority, thus in the aggregate
the bloc is at worst neutral to the homogeneous members. Since both cases are
possible, overall there is a surplus for the homogeneous members (maybe not so
for the heterogeneous one).
In Section 3 and 4 we will show under which conditions will every member
of an heterogeneous coalition benefit from the formation of a voting bloc. We
now ask whether the formation of a voting bloc benefits or harms the interests
of the agents who are not part of the coalition. The answer will depend on the
voting rule in the general election:
If the rule in the general election is unanimity, then each agent has a veto
power over changes to the status quo. If a coalition forms a voting bloc, it
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removes the veto power to its members, but not to non-members, who therefore
benefit from the formation of a voting bloc by the coalition. If the rule in the
general election is simple majority, a voting bloc will only change the outcome
to make a minority the winner. That is contrary to the interests of a majority
of non-members of the coalition.
Proposition 2 Let type pi ∈ (0, 1) for each agent i in the society and let coali-
tion C form a voting bloc with any internal rule other than unanimity. Then,
if the voting rule in the general election is unanimity, every agent in the soci-
ety strictly benefits from the formation of the voting bloc. If the general voting
rule is simple majority, there is an aggregated loss in expected utility for the M
agents not in the coalition.
Proof. Let j be an agent not in the coalition. If T = M + N + 1, then if j
or any other agent not in the coalition does not support alternative a, it has
the power to veto it by voting ”no”. So the formation of a bloc has no impact
whenever j or any other agent not in the coalition opposes alternative a.
If all M agents, including j, support alternative a, then without a bloc it
would be necessary for each and every member of the coalition to support it as
well in order for a to pass the vote. Should a bloc be formed, it is enough that
a suﬃcient majority within the coalition supports a, for then the minority of
negative votes will be rolled and a would be implemented. With types pi ∈ (0, 1)
and any rule other than unanimity as internal voting rule for the coalition, there
is a positive probability of rolling a minority of negative votes in the voting bloc.
This probability increases the utility of the agents not in the coalition.
If T = M+N2 + 1, then the aggregated utility for the whole society is maxi-
mized without a voting bloc, because the maximal social welfare is achieved by
always implementing the wishes of the majority. Since a voting bloc generates
extra utility for the members of the coalition whilst it reduces total social wel-
fare by making minorities win, it must then be the case that non-members are
harmed by the voting bloc.
Even if the formation of a voting bloc is in the aggregate hurting non-
members of the coalition, this eﬀect will in general not be uniform: Some agents
not in the coalition will win, some lose expected utility if the coalition forms a
voting bloc. For instance, suppose that the members of the coalition have types
such that almost always the yes wins in the coalitional internal vote and a small
but significant no minority is rolled. Then the bloc behavior by the coalition
tilts the general vote in favor of alternative a. Agents with a high type, who
are likely to prefer alternative a, will be then happy to see the coalition form
a voting bloc. Of course, the behavior of the voting bloc hurts in our example
those with a lower type.
Recapitulating what we have learnt in this section: Forming a voting bloc
is inconsequential if the coalition uses unanimity as internal voting rule, but
with any other rule, forming a bloc gives a surplus in utility to the coalition and
simple majority is the internal voting rule that maximizes such surplus. Every
agent in the rest of the society benefits from the formation of a bloc by the
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coalition if the general voting rule is unanimity, but if the general voting rule is
simple majority these agents suﬀer an aggregate loss in utility, though some of
them may still benefit from the formation of a voting bloc by the coalition.
In the next section we investigate under what conditions the coalition can
reach unanimous agreement among its members to proceed with the formation
of a voting bloc and appropriate the surplus in utility that comes with the voting
bloc.
3 Achieving consensus to form a Voting Bloc:
We wish to find an internal rule for the coalition to aggregate preferences in
such a way that maximizes the aggregated utility of its members, whilst not
hurting individually any of them relative to a default in which the coalition
uses unanimity as internal voting rule and all members always vote according
to their true preferences in the general election.
Throughout this section we assume that the general election rule is simple
majority.
We assume that each of the members of the coalition can block the formation
of a voting bloc, so we need to find a rule to aggregate internal preferences such
that every member prefers this rule better than unanimity.
Given an internal voting rule v, we say that itPareto-dominates unanimity
for C if every member in C is weakly better oﬀ using v rather than unanimity
as internal voting rule and some member in C is strictly better oﬀ.
The purpose of this section is to find out which majority rules Pareto-
dominate unanimity for C. If there are several majority rules that Pareto-
dominate unanimity for C, we focus on whichever one maximizes the overall
surplus for the coalition. We recall from Proposition 1 that the internal voting
rule that maximizes the aggregated utility for the coalition is simple majority.
However, in an heterogeneous coalition, some members may not benefit from
pooling votes in a voting bloc with simple majority.
In this section, we compare the default rule of unanimity with t−majority
rules.
We label unanimity rule as ∅ as a reminder that using unanimity as internal
voting rule is identical to not forming a voting bloc, or no member joining the
voting bloc. It is the default rule in the absence of agreement, thus it is the
benchmark we use as comparison with other rules.
We label as t a t − majority rule in which every member of the coalition
participates in the voting bloc, and minorities of size strictly less than t(N +1)
are rolled to join the position of the majority of the coalition in the general vote.
Simple majority, denoted Sm, refers to the special case in which t = 12 .
Let A and B be two internal voting rules for coalition C. For i ∈ C, let
p−i be a vector with the types of all agents in the society except for i. Let us
then define two functions, which depend on the rules A and B, and the vector
of types p−i:
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αi(B,A, p−i) = Probability that, given that member i prefers yes, the out-
come in the general election is yes if the coalition uses rule B and no if it uses
rule A.
βi(B,A, p−i) = Probability that, given that member i prefers no, the out-
come in the general election is no if the coalition uses rule B and yes if it uses
rule A.
Given two rules A and B, a profile of types for all the agents in the society
and a member i, we can partition the set of realizations of preferences for or
against alternative a in just three events:
Eo contains all the realizations of preferences for which the outcome in the
general election is the same regardless of whether the coalition uses A or B as
internal voting rule.
E1 contains all the realizations of preferences for which the outcome coincides
with the preference of member i if the coalition uses rule B but not if it uses
rule A.
E2 contains all the realizations of preferences for which the outcome coincides
with the preference of member i if the coalition uses rule A but not if if uses
rule B.
Then member i prefers to use rule B if and only if the event E1 occurs with
higher probability than the event E2. The event E1 occurs with probability
pi ∗ αi(B,A, p−i) + (1− pi)βi(B,A, p−i), the event E2 occurs with probability
pi ∗ αi(A,B, p−i) + (1− pi)βi(A,B, p−i).
The following lemma completes this intuition, relating preferences over rules
to individual types:
Lemma 1 Given two internal voting rules B and A for coalition C, a member
i of the coalition C is indiﬀerent between them if:
pi =
βi(A,B,p−i)−βi(B,A,p−i)
αi(B,A,p−i)−αi(A,B,p−i)+βi(A,B,p−i)−βi(B,A,p−i)
.
Proof. Let EUi(A) denote the utility for agent i of forming a voting bloc with
internal rule A when simple majority is the rule used in the general election and
let EUi(B) be analogously defined. Then EUi(B)−EUi(A) = pi[αi(B,A, p−i)−
αi(A,B, p−i)] + (1− pi)[βi(B,A, p−i)− βi(A,B, p−i)].
Equating to zero and solving for pi we get
pi =
βi(A,B, p−i)− βi(B,A, p−i)
αi(B,A, p−i)− αi(A,B, p−i) + βi(A,B, p−i)− βi(B,A, p−i)
.
Before presenting our results, we need to make some assumptions on the
types of the agents:
Assumption 1 The number of favorable votes cast by the M agents not in
coalition C follows a symmetric distribution around M2 with some positive prob-
ability of casting a quantity of favorable votes diﬀerent than M2 .
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A suﬃcient condition for this assumption to be true is that all M agents
can be paired in such way that for each pair (j, j0), pj + pj0 = 1, and at least
two agents have a type strictly between zero and one. We let f (x) denote the
probability that the M members cast exactly x favorable votes for alternative
a, and we let F (x) =
Px
k=0 f(x) be the distribution function of the number of
favorable votes cast by the M agents not in the coalition.
We make a milder assumption on the types of the members of coalition C,
namely, we assume that coalition C "leans towards" accepting alternative a.
Let gi,j(x) denote the probability that x members of C\{i, j}, of the coalition
without i or j, prefer alternative a. Then we require the following:
Assumption 2 For all k ∈ [0, N2 − 1] and for all i, j ∈ C, gij(
N
2 + k) >
gij(N2 − k − 1).
Note that glh(k) =
P
A⊆C\{l,h}
|A|=k
[
Q
i∈A
j∈C\(A∪{l,h})
pi(1− pj)].
Assumption 2 states that given any N−1 members of the coalition and given
any particular majority-minority split of votes in this subset of the coalition, it
is more probable that this majority in the subset is for the yes side. A suﬃcient
condition for our assumption to hold is that excluding any three members, we
can pair the rest in such a way that for each pair (i, i0), pi+pi0 ≥ 1 and at least
one pair is diﬀerent from (0.5, 0.5).
Let gi(x) denote the probability that exactly x members of C\i, of the coali-
tion without i, prefer alternative a. Formally gl(k) =
P
A⊆C\l
|A|=k
[
Q
i∈A
j∈C\(A∪l)
pi(1−pj)].
From Assumption 2 it follows that for all k ∈ [1, N2 ] and for all i ∈ C, gi(
N
2 +k) >
gi(N2 − k). We show this in the Appendix
With these two assumptions on the types of the agents and simple majority
as voting rule in the general election, we find that a member of the coalition
will like to form a voting bloc with a t −majority rule as internal voting rule
if her type is "high enough": If a given member would benefit from forming a
voting bloc with a t −majority, then every other member with a higher type
would benefit even further:
Lemma 2 Let l, h ∈ C such that ph ≥ pl. Then EUh[t] − EUh[∅] ≥ EUl[t] −
EUl[∅].
The proof is in the Appendix.
We can then focus only on the member with the lowest type to see if she
benefits from the formation of a voting bloc with a t −majority. If she does,
then every member in the coalition benefits from forming a voting bloc with a
t−majority rule:
Proposition 3 Let l ∈ C be the member with the lowest type. Then a t −
majority rule Pareto-dominates unanimity as internal voting rule for coalition
C if and only if pl > p
t,∅
l (p−l).
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In the Appendix we find the exact expression of pt,∅l (p−l) as a function of
the types of the agents and the threshold t and we proof the proposition.
Since the coalition "leans" towards accepting alternative a, the majority
within the coalition will more often than not be in favor of alternative a, with
the result that the negative votes will be rolled more often than the favorable
ones, making it more likely that alternative a wins the general election. Member
l only likes such voting behavior if her type is high "enough", where the exact
meaning of "enough" is given by the threshold in the Proposition.
The threshold pt,∅l (p−l) converges to 1 as every type pi, i ∈ C\l converges
to 1. On the other hand as gl(N2 + k) − gl(
N
2 − k) converges to zero (as the
distribution of votes by the other members of the coalition converges to a sym-
metric one), the threshold pt,∅l (p−l) converges to −∞. A threshold below zero
indicates that member l supports the creation of a voting bloc regardless of her
own type.
We illustrate Proposition 3 with the aid of Figure 1, for the specific case of
simple majority as internal voting rule.
To be able to plot the threshold pSm,∅l (p−l) with respect to only one variable,
we assume that the distribution of votes by the agents not in coalition C follows
a binomial Bi(M, 12 ) and that all the members of coalition C except l share
a common type r. A single parameter r is suﬃcient (captures all the relevant
information about the types of the rest of members of C) to determine if member
l would benefit from the formation of a voting bloc: For any heterogeneous
coalition in which all other members but l did not share a common type, that
coalition is mapped to one particular value of r such that l evaluates coalition C
as if all the other members had a common type r. Therefore, Figure 1 indirectly
captures all possible coalitions of size N. In Figure 1 we set M = 176 and
N = 24 to approximate our European Union example. We will use these values
in most of our figures.
Our model corresponds to the right half the graph: If the common type r
of the N members other than l is bigger than one half, member l will support
the formation of a voting bloc with simple majority if the type pl is above the
depicted threshold. The left half of the picture is a symmetric case in which
the coalition leans towards rejecting a. Then member l will only support the
formation of a bloc if her type is below the threshold.
The following proposition tells us that some coalitions that can’t form a
voting bloc with simple majority can form a voting bloc with some supermajority
rule in such a way that every member’s utility increases.
The threshold function pt,∅l (p−l) is decreasing in t. The higher the t −
majority rule used as internal voting rule, the more type profiles for which the
t−majority rule Pareto-dominates unanimity for coalition C:
Proposition 4 Let t0 = t + 1N+1 . Then for any t ∈ [
1
2 ,
N−1
N+1 ), the subset of
type profiles for which a t−majority rule Pareto-dominates unanimity for C is
strictly contained in the subset of types for which a t0 −majority rule Pareto-
dominates unanimity for C.
The proof is in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Consensus to form a voting bloc with simple majority
The more stringent the supermajority rule the coalition uses, the lower that
the type of member l can be and yet allow l to benefit from the formation of a
voting bloc with the t−majority internal voting rule.
We depict this result in Figure 2 for N = 24, M = 176, F is a binomial
Bi(M, 12) and every member of C except for l has a type r >
1
2 .
Figure 2 presents four diﬀerent possible rules a coalition the size of the
EU: Simple majority, two-thirds majority, four-fifths majority, and nine-tenths
majority.
We see how the range of parameters for which a voting bloc would bene-
fit every member increases as the supermajority rule becomes more stringent.
However, since simple majority maximizes the overall surplus for the coalition,
setting higher thresholds for approval of a common position diminishes the value
of the voting bloc, though it may help to bring an outlier on board.
Aiming to maximize the utility of the coalition subject to not hurting any
member, the idea would be to find the lowest possible supermajority threshold
that would benefit (or at least leave indiﬀerent) the member with the lowest
type. A consequence of Proposition 4 is that for any t0 ∈ [12 ,
N−1
N+1 ) there exists
a profile of types such that t0 maximizes the surplus for the coalition among the
class of t−majority rules which Pareto-dominate unanimity.
In the remainder of this section we investigate how changes in the size of
the coalition or the heterogeneity of types of its members aﬀect which rules the
coalition will be able to use to the benefit of all its members.
We find that if the size of the coalition is too large, then no coalition in
which all members but l share a common type r > pl can form a voting bloc
with simple majority.
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Proposition 5 Let M be fixed. Let pl < r for l ∈ C and pi = r for all
i ∈ C\{l}. There exists some N such that if N > N, simple majority does not
Pareto dominate unanimity for C.
We proof this in the Appendix.
As the coalition becomes very large relative to M, the internal majority
coincides with the external majority unless the coalition is almost evenly split.
The coalition is more likely to vote for a than against a. Since member l is the
member with the lowest type, conditional on the coalition being evenly split,
member l is more likely to be against a, thus in the losing side. Therefore, if
the coalition becomes so large that rolling its votes only aﬀects the outcome
when the coalition is almost evenly split, the member with the lowest type
rejects the formation of a bloc with simple majority and in the limit only a fully
homogeneous coalition where every member has the same type could form a
voting bloc with simple majority.
This finding runs contrary to the perceived experience in the EU, where
successive enlargements have put pressure to lower the supermajority thresh-
olds. The European Union traditionally used very stringent supermajority re-
quirements, often unanimity: In a larger Union, the inadequacy of such rules
becomes obvious and the EU now faces a pressure to lower the degree of con-
sensus necessary to take a common decision. Had the Union been using simple
majority, it should have experienced a pressure to rise, not lower the superma-
jority requirement as the Union got larger.
Figure 3 shows the convergence of the threshold pSm,∅l (r,N) to r as N gets
large, given that F is a binomial Bi(M, 12), M = 60 and pi = r ∀i ∈ C\l. The
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Figure 3: Convergence of pSm,∅l (r,N) to r in a dichotomous coalition.
three plots (from bottom to top) correspond to a common value r = 0.6 (we
show the convergence asymptote as well), a common value 0.85 and a common
value 0.95 for the N members not l in the coalition.
Beyond size, we ask how does heterogeneity aﬀect the chances of a coalition
to form a voting bloc. We know that an homogeneous coalition will always find
simple majority to Pareto dominate unanimity for the coalition, whereas het-
erogeneous coalitions may run into obstacles. Nevertheless, we show by means
of an example that the possibility of forming a voting bloc with simple majority
is not monotonic with heterogeneity:
We compare three coalitions with the same mean type and the same lowest
type. We measure heterogeneity by the standard deviation of types. We find
that the most homogeneous and the least homogeneous of the three cannot form
a voting bloc with simple majority, whereas the intermediate one can.
Example 1 Let all agents not in C have a type pm = 0.5 and let there be 10 of
them.
Let C1 be a coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75}.
The mean type is 0.689. The standard deviation 0.1368. If C = C1, then
pSm,∅l (p−l) = 0.4943 and l rejects the formation of a voting bloc with simple
majority as internal voting rule.
Let C2 be another coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 1}, mean
type 0.689, standard deviation 0.2847. If C = C2, then p
Sm,∅
l (p−l) = 0.441 so
forming a voting bloc with simple majority benefits every member of the coalition.
Let C3 be yet another coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.45, 0.55, 1,
1}, mean type 0.689, standard deviation 0.2869. If C = C3, then p
Sm,∅
l (p−l)
= 0.446 so once again member l vetoes the formation of a voting bloc with simple
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majority.
For coalitions C1 and C3 in Example 1, using a two-thirds majority or a
three-quarters majority (or any other value of t that requires a majority of 4 to
1 to roll the minority) every member benefits from forming a voting bloc: In C1,
using t = 3/4, p3/4,∅l (p−l) = 0.39 so member l favors the formation of a voting
bloc that rolls only minorities of size one. Similar results hold for coalition C3.
We quantify the impact that the formation of a voting bloc by coalition C1
in Example 1 would have over the outcome in the general election. We show the
results in Table 1. The numbers indicate the probability that the event indicated
in each row occurs, given the internal rule the coalition uses. In the first column,
the coalition uses unanimity or forms no bloc, in the second column it forms a
bloc with simple majority and in the third column it uses a 3/4 majority.
TABLE 1 No bloc 1/2 maj 3/4 maj
a approved 69.52% 79.58% 73.45%
a approved given l likes a 79.82% 90.00% 84.72%
a approved given l dislikes a 61.26% 71.22% 64.42%
l satisfied with outcome 57.02% 56.02% 57.44%
j ∈ C\l satisfied with outcome 67.26% 74.70% 70.57%
m /∈ C satisfied with outcome 59.44% 53.51% 57.61%
Since the coalition leans towards a, forming a voting bloc makes approval
of a more likely. All the members except for l benefit and all non-members are
hurt forming a voting bloc. Member l is hurt if simple majority is used, so in
order to benefit all its members, the coalition has to select a supermajority that
makes l better oﬀ, but attenuates the advantage for all the other members. We
see that forming a voting bloc with simple majority would have a substantial
impact: The probability of approving a increases ten percentage points, the
probability of getting the desired outcome out of the election would increase
seven percentage points for all members of coalition C1 but l. Using a 3/4
majority reduces this benefit of a voting bloc to roughly a half, but it makes all
members of C1 more likely to see their preference prevail in the general election.
In this section we have described the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
a coalition to be able to form a voting bloc with a majority rule. We show
that although simple majority maximizes the aggregate surplus, there are type
profiles for which simple majority does not Pareto dominate unanimity but some
supermajority rules do and the coalition can choose one of them to gain some
of the surplus of a voting bloc benefiting all its members.
4 An Opt-Out rule:
In this section we explore a more nuanced rule, which consists on forming a
voting bloc with all but one of the members of the coalition: The excluded
member does not participate in the internal vote of the voting bloc, but votes
directly and according to her true preferences in the general election.
This scheme diﬀers from expelling one member from the coalition in a crucial
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detail: The exclusion is voluntary, the member who does not participate in the
voting bloc agrees to the formation of the voting bloc without her, hence it
opts to be out, or "opts-out". The member who opts out has to benefit from
the formation of the voting bloc by the other members, otherwise she would
rather veto the whole project and keep unanimity in place as the voting rule to
aggregate votes in the coalition.
Famous opt-outs in the European Union include the UK and Denmark with
regards to the European Monetary Union: Their approval to the Maastricht
Treaty was necessary for the monetary union to bring about the euro, and they
supported the implementation of the treaty, whilst staying out of the project.
If they had deemed it harmful to their interests, they could have refused to sign
it.
We denote by Out the "Opt-Out for l" rule in which the member l with the
lowest type does not participate in the voting bloc, which is formed by every
other member of the coalition and simple majority is chosen as internal voting
rule.
We could extend the results in this section to consider opting-out rules in
which l stayed out and the participating members chose a supermajority as
internal voting rule, but for simplicity we focus on the rule that will maximize
the surplus for the members who participate in the bloc given that l will not
join them.
Throughout the section we assume that the general election rule is simple
majority.
Proposition 6 The formation of a voting bloc with simple majority rule by
every member of coalition C except l, benefits member l if and only if pl >
pOut,∅l (p−l).
We provide the expression of pOut,∅l (p−l) and a proof in the Appendix.
The threshold function pOut,∅l (p−l) is always positive given our assumptions
on types, it is not increasing with respect to the type of all other members of
the coalition and it does not always converge to one as the types of the members
of the coalition do. This last feature guarantees that in some cases in which
member l rejects forming a voting bloc with simple majority she benefits from
the formation of a bloc with an "Opt-Out for l" rule. If all the other members
also benefit from the "Opt-Out for l" rule, then this rule Pareto-dominates
unanimity and it oﬀers a solution for a coalition which couldn’t form a bloc
with t−majority rules. The next Proposition states this result:
Proposition 7 If 4 ≤ N ≤ M, there exist type profiles for which an "Opt-
Out for l" internal voting rule Pareto-dominates unanimity for C and no t −
majority rule does. If N = 2 or N > M, there exists no type profile for which
"Opt-Out for l" Pareto-dominates unanimity for C and simple majority doesn’t.
The Appendix contains a proof of Proposition 7. Here we sketch the intu-
ition: For the negative statement, if N = 2, allowing one member to step-out
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Figure 4: An Opt-Out rule as a solution
reduces the bloc to size two, which is identical to not forming a bloc at all, or
forming it with unanimity. If N > M, then the coalition acts as a dictator even
if one member opts-out, thus the member who opts-out cannot be better oﬀ out
of the voting bloc than in the voting bloc.
We use Figure 4 to gain some insight about the threshold pOut,∅l (p−l) and its
comparison with pSm,∅l (p−l). As in all figures, we assume that the distribution
of votes by the agents not in coalition C follows a binomial Bi(M, 12) and that
all the members of coalition C except l share a common type r.We setM = 176
and N = 24.
Looking at Figure 4, we notice that if types are in the area below the thresh-
old pSm,∅l (p−l) and above p
Out,∅
l (p−l), l would veto forming a voting bloc with
simple majority if it included all the members, but allowing l to stay out, the
coalition can form a voting bloc with simple majority with every other member
and in expectation raise the utility of every member including l.
This result casts a favorable light over "opt-out" rules. On the other hand,
"opt-out" rules have two setbacks:
If the coalition is heterogeneous (and not just dichotomous with all members
but l sharing a common type) and the member with the lowest type opts out, it
is possible that the member with the second lowest type opposes the formation of
the reduced bloc in which he is now the member with the lowest type. Allowing
the member with the second lowest type to opt-out as well may lead the member
with the third lowest type to oppose the formation of a bloc, and so on until
the voting bloc fully unravels and every member but two opt-out, which negates
the purpose of a voting bloc.
Even if this unravelling does not take place, there is a second latent compli-
cation to opt-out rules: If the coalition allows for the member with the lowest
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type to opt-out, then other members may also request to opt-out, even if they
benefit from the formation of a voting bloc, simply because they would benefit
even further by opting-out. If the coalition lets every member join in or stay
out of the voting bloc, then it faces a "free-rider" problem, where some mem-
bers who would benefit from joining the voting bloc, may prefer to opt-out and
passively take advantage of the pooling of votes by other coalition partners. We
exclude from our concept of free-riding situations in which a member opts-out
of a voting bloc and benefits from the pooling of votes by the other members if
the member who opts-out would be hurt by a voting bloc that included him:
Definition 1 Member l "free-rides" if she would have benefitted from forming
and participating in a voting bloc, but benefits even more as a result of opting-
out.
With no opt-out rules, there is no chance to free-ride, since the coalition faces
an "all-or-none" binary decision: Either every member joins the voting bloc, or
the bloc is not formed. If instead members can individually choose whether
to join in or to stay out, some may not choose to join in. In the following
Proposition we explore whether a member would prefer to participate in or to
stay out of a voting bloc formed by every other member of the coalition.
Proposition 8 Member l prefers to participate in a voting bloc formed by the
coalition with simple majority as internal decision rule better than to opt-out
and not participate in the pooling of votes by the rest of the members of the
coalition if and only if pl > p
Sm,Out
l (p−l).
We provide the exact expression of pSm,Outl (p−l) and a proof in the Appen-
dix. We could extend this result to consider opt-out rules where the members
that form the voting bloc use a supermajority instead of simple majority.
From Proposition 3 we obtain the condition for l to benefit from forming
and participating in a voting bloc with simple majority. Proposition 8 now
states when will member l prefer to opt-out from such a bloc. Combining
Propositions 3 and 8 we obtain Proposition 9. It outlines the downside of Opt-
Out rules: The creation of a free-riding problem when member l would benefit
from participating in the bloc but prefers to opt-out.
Proposition 9 An "Opt-Out for l" rule creates a free-rider problem if and only
if pSm,∅l (p−l) < pl < p
Sm,Out
l (p−l). If 4 ≤ N ≤ M, there exist type profiles for
which this condition is met. If N = 2 or N > M, this condition cannot hold
and free-riding cannot occur.
A proof is in the Appendix.
If pl < p
Sm,Out
l (p−l), member l prefers not to participate in the voting bloc
and she free-rides if participating would be better for l than not forming a voting
bloc.
When member l compares the utility of being in the bloc, or out of the
bloc, she compares the probability of aﬀecting the general outcome to make it
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coincide with her wishes when she votes directly in the general election, to the
same probability voting through the voting bloc.
This analysis of the utility of being in or being out of a voting bloc bears
some resemblance, but is not equivalent, to the comparison of probabilities of
being decisive (of being pivotal in the final outcome) that occupy the voting
power literature. In a nutshell, in the voting power literature the agents seek to
maximize their probability of being able to alter the outcome, whereas in our
model they only care to alter the outcome towards their preference:
If an agent can change the outcome against his preference by joining a voting
bloc and casting a vote against his preference, whereas if he stays out of the bloc
his vote is irrelevant, then the agent in our model is indiﬀerent between being
out of the bloc and being irrelevant but getting the desired outcome, or being in
the bloc and being crucial to obtain the desired outcome. For a rigorous study
of the relation and diﬀerences between voting power and probability of success
or satisfaction (the approach we take), we recommend Laruelle and Valenciano
[10].
Let us visualize when will a member prefer to opt-out and free-ride on her
coalition partners with the aid of Figure 5, where again N = 24, M = 176, the
24 members other than l in coalition C share a common type r and the number
of favorable votes by agents not in the coalition follows a binomial Bi(M, 12).
If type pl is above p
Sm,∅
l (p−l) but below p
Sm,Out
l (p−l), member l would
have supported a voting bloc with simple majority and no opt-outs better than
nothing, but she prefers to opt-out if she can. If she opts-out, the overall utility
for the coalition is reduced.
If not only l but any member can opt-out, then coalitions of size less than
M face an even worse problem: For some configurations of types all members
19
would prefer to opt-out. If N > M, then the coalition forming a voting bloc is
a dictator and thus votes of agents not in the voting bloc don’t count at all and
no member can gain anything opting out.
As a summary, allowing a member to opt-out can be a good solution in a
coalition with great homogeneity of types and one outlier, but in many other
instances it can generate free-rider problems, aggravated if the possibility to
opt-out is extended to every member.
5 Conclusions and Extensions:
A coalition of agents who are part of a larger electorate facing a vote may choose
to form a voting bloc, thus deciding according to some internal voting rule which
way the whole coalition will vote in the general election, after rolling the internal
minorities.
We’ve shown that forming a voting bloc generates a surplus in the aggregate
utility of the members of the coalition and we’ve checked that simple majority
is the internal rule for the voting bloc that maximizes such surplus.
However, if there is heterogeneity among the members of the coalition, the
surplus will not be evenly shared, and in the absence of transfers, the formation
of a voting bloc may be detrimental to some members of the coalition. Ordering
members from "least likely" to "most likely" to support changes to the status
quo, we find a single cutting point or threshold separating those members of the
coalition who support the formation of a voting bloc, and those who reject it.
This implies that either every agent in the coalition supports the voting bloc, or
at most agents at one tail of the distribution of types reject it, but it will never
be the case that extremists from both tails reject the formation of a voting bloc.
We find it interesting to compare this result with a diﬀerent model of fed-
eralism, by Crémer and Palfrey [5] and [6]. Crémer and Palfrey argue that
moderate voters, with preferences closer to the median of the Union, will ad-
vocate federalism and unified policies. Complementing their work, our paper
provides a rationale for at least one set of extreme voters to wish for a common
foreign policy: If the binary choice is between the status quo and "change" and
forming a voting bloc the aggregate vote for the whole coalition will most likely
be "change", then voters within each country who want "change" see a better
chance of getting it through a unified federal government.
Under the motivation that each member of the coalition may have a veto
over the formation of any kind of voting bloc, we analyze possible solutions to
achieve unanimous support by all members of the coalition to proceed with some
form of voting bloc when some member of the coalition opposes the solution
which maximizes the total surplus of utility: A voting bloc formed by the whole
coalition with simple majority as internal decision rule.
We find that, for some range of parameters, allowing an extreme agent who
is opposed to the formation of a voting bloc to opt-out and not participate
in the bloc is suﬃcient to achieve unanimous support (including support by
the member who chooses to opt-out) to the formation of a voting bloc by the
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rest of the coalition. Though it may look strange to require an agent that
does not participate in the bloc to acquiesce to its formation, we think the
relevant example of the EU (where each country has a veto power over changes
on fundamental treaties and thus can stop an initiative regardless of whether
it includes or excludes the vetoing country) provides enough motivation to find
this result important.
Another solution that also reduces the overall surplus in utility but helps
to achieve unanimous support for the formation of a voting bloc is the use of
qualified majority rules (supermajorities) as internal voting rules. The higher
the threshold of the qualified majority rule, the less likely that any agent would
be hurt by the formation of a bloc. This result contrasts with the findings of
Maggi and Morelli’s paper [11] in which only simple majority or unanimity are
ever found to be optimal.
The implications for the European Union are straight forward: Assuming
that the preferences of Union members, albeit diﬀerent, are not squarely opposed
to each other, unanimity is not the best rule that the Union can use to aggregate
the votes of its members: Every one of the 25 countries in the EU would be
more likely to see its preference prevail at a UN Assembly vote if the Union
first pre-determined how it will cast all its 25 votes according to an internal
voting rule that rolled minorities within the EU. The wider range of foreign
policy goes beyond the scope of this paper; we just focus on pooling votes in
an scenario in which all members are symmetric: In terms of winning votes
in international forums that grant one vote per country, the EU (or any other
collection of countries with some similarity in their policy preferences) would do
better by forging a common foreign policy that was not based on unanimity.
This model could be extended to incorporate decision costs of forming a
voting bloc and of course that would make it harder to achieve unanimous
support for the voting bloc. Alternatively, a more favorable setting for voting
blocs could be envisioned by considering economies of scale, where the joint
expression of will by a united coalition has more power in the general electorate
than the individual sum of the votes of the coalition members. That is diﬃcult
to justify in terms of votes, but is much more reasonable if lobbying, exerting
political pressure or otherwise influencing others are parts of the actions that
come with voting in one or the other direction.
Another extension within the framework of the model would be to consid-
erate correlation in the realization of the preferences of the members of the
coalition, possibly through a correlation matrix. A way to partially incorporate
correlation without adding too substantial complications would be to define a
"leader of the coalition" and then let the type of every other agent be a two-
dimensional vector, stating the probability of supporting the alternative if the
leader does and if the leader doesn’t. Then we could use the model we have
presented here for each of the two cases taking them separately and aggregate
them to obtain expected utilities.
A more ambitious extension that we think deserves future research consists
on allowing several coalitions, and not just one to form voting blocs. Ideally, any
subset of agents would be allowed to form a voting bloc and we would look for
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stable partitions of the space of agents into voting blocs, stability implying that
no agent wishes to abandon the voting bloc that it belongs to. We find strong
justification for our assumption of a single coalition considering the formation of
a voting bloc in the case of international relations, where the 25 countries in the
EU participate in a project that is, to a large extent, unique. However, another
very natural scenario to look for voting blocs, in fact an even more appropriate
one, is any legislature in which political parties may be formed. If we want to
explain party formation, we need to allow for diﬀerent parties to exist. Starting
with a set of individual legislators, "parties" would be each one of the voting
blocs that are formed.
Some models studying the incentives to party formation are grounded on
a distributive politics setting, where parties help agents to "get a share of the
pie", as in Baron [2]. Jackson and Moselle [9] attempt to model coalition and
party formation with both distributive and ideological dimensions. Our ap-
proach would try to explain party formation solely on the grounds of enhanced
probabilities of getting the desired ideological outcome.
We leave these and other developments for future research.
6 Appendix:
6.1 Proposition 1:
Proof. Let s denote the size of the minority in the coalitional internal vote, S
the size of the majority in such vote, thus s+S = N +1, let EUTi (t) denote the
expected utility for agent i ∈ C given that the whole coalition C forms a voting
bloc with t as the internal proportion threshold above which the coalition will roll
its minorities in the general election vote and given that T is the number of votes
needed in the general election for alternative a to be implemented. Similarly let
EUTi (∅) denote the expected utility for agent i ∈ C if the coalition does not
form a voting bloc and T is the threshold in the general election. Then:P
i∈C
EUi(t) −
P
i∈C
EUTi (∅) =
N/2P
k=1
(N + 1 − 2k) ∗ Pr[s = k] ∗ Pr[minority is
rolled] ∗ Pr[rolling k votes alters outcome].
With either simple majority or supermajority rules short of unanimity, Pr[minority
is rolled] is equal to one if s = 1. All the other terms in the expression are strictly
positive for types pi ∈ (0, 1), thus the aggregated expected surplus in utility for
the coalition generated by the voting bloc is strictly positive.
Proposition 1 also notes that no other rule yields a higher surplus in utility
(in probability of getting the desired option after the final vote) than simple
majority. The optimality of simple majority rule as internal aggregation rule
for a set of agents (in our case coalition C) for any common type p is mentioned
in Rae [12] and proved in Taylor [13]. We check that we can extend this result
to fit our model with an individual type for each agent:
Let Sm denote simple majority as internal voting rule for coalition C, and let
vr denote any other internal voting rule for coalition C. Under Sm, all the votes
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of the coalition are always cast in favor of the position chosen by the majority of
the coalition, thus no other rule can give more votes to the position favored by
a majority of the coalition. Therefore, if for some voting behavior the outcome
in the general election depends on whether the coalition uses vr or Sm, it must
be that the outcome under Sm is the one favored by the majority, and under
vr the one favored by the minority. Let v ∈ {0, 1}M+N+1 be a realization of the
preferences of all members of the society, where 0 represents a no preference and
1 a yes preference. Let Pr(v) be the probability that the realization v occurs,
according to the vector of types of all agents. Let q(vr|v) denote the probability
that given preferences v, the outcome in the general election depends on whether
C uses rule vr or Sm as internal voting rule. Then:X
i∈C
EUi(Sm)−
X
i∈C
EUTi (vr) =
X
v∈{0,1}M+N+1
(S − s) Pr(v)q(vr|v).
This term is always non-negative and it is strictly positive for any rule vr that
with positive probability will bring about a diﬀerent outcome than Sm.
6.2 Claim from Assumption 2:
Assumption 2: For all k ∈ [0, N2 − 1] and for all i, j ∈ C, gij(
N
2 + k) > gij(
N
2 −
k − 1).
We want to show: For all k ∈ [1, N2 ] and for all i ∈ C, gi(
N
2 +k) > gi(
N
2 −k).
Proof. gij(x) is the distribution of a sum of N−1 independent Bernoulli trials,
each trial taking the type of a member of C\{i, j} as probability of success.
The sum of independent Bernoulli trials is a unimodal distribution, as shown
by Darroch [7]. Therefore, gij(N2 +k−1) > gij(
N
2 −k) implies gij(
N
2 +k−1) >
gij(N2 − k − 1).
For any i, j, gi(N2 + k)− gi(
N
2 − k) is equal to:
pjgij(
N
2
+ k − 1) + (1− pj)gij(
N
2
+ k)− pjgij(
N
2
− k − 1)− (1− pj)gij(
N
2
− k)
> (2pj − 1)gij(
N
2
+ k − 1)− (2pj − 1)gij(
N
2
− k − 1)
> (2pj − 1)[gij(
N
2
+ k − 1)− gij(
N
2
− k − 1)].
Since this is true for any i, j, and since by Assumption 2 at least two members
have a type over a half, then for any i this last expression is true for at least
one j with pj > 12 . Then gi(
N
2 + k)− gi(
N
2 − k) > 0.
6.3 Lemma 2:
We want to show that EUh[t]−EUh[∅]− (EUl[t]−EUl[∅]) ≥ 0.
Proof. EUl[t]−EUl[∅] =
pl ∗αl(t,∅, p−l)+(1−pl)∗βl(t,∅, p−l)−pl ∗αl(∅, t, p−l)−(1−pl)∗βl(∅, t, p−l)
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and similarly EUh[t]−EUh[∅] =
ph∗αh(t,∅, p−h)+(1−ph)∗βh(t,∅, p−h)−ph∗αh(∅, t, p−h)−(1−ph)∗βh(∅, t, p−h).
In Step 1 we show that
ph∗αh(t,∅, p−h)+(1−ph)∗βh(t,∅, p−h)−pl∗αl(t,∅, p−l)−(1−pl)∗βl(t,∅, p−l)
is positive. In Step 2, we show that
−ph∗αh(∅, t, p−h)−(1−ph)∗βh(∅, t, p−h)+pl∗αl(∅, t, p−l)+(1−pl)∗βl(∅, t, p−l)
is also positive, thus adding all the terms, EUh[t]−EUh[∅]− (EUl[t]−EUl[∅])
is also positive.
Step 1:
Let dxe denote the smallest integer equal or larger than x and similarly let
bxc denote the largest integer smaller or equal to x. With this conventin, for
i = {l, h},
αi(t,∅, p−i) =
N−1X
k=dtNe
gi(k)[F (
M +N
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)].
Then, writing gl(k) as gl(k) = phglh(k − 1) + (1− ph)glh(k), we obtain:
pl∗αl(t,∅, p−l) =
N−1X
k=dtNe
pl[ph∗glh(k−1)+(1−ph)glh(k)][F (
M +N
2
−k−1)−F (M −N
2
−1)]
and
ph∗αh(t,∅, p−h) =
N−1X
k=dtNe
ph[pl∗glh(k−1)+(1−pl)glh(k)][F (
M +N
2
−k−1)−F (M −N
2
−1)],
so:
ph∗αh(t,∅, p−h)−pl∗αl(t,∅, p−l) =
N−1X
k=dtNe
[(ph−pl)glh(k)][F (
M +N
2
−k−1)−F (M −N
2
−1)].
which relabeling the counter in the summation becomes:
N
2 −1X
k=dtNe−N2
[(ph − pl)glh(
N
2
+ k)][F (
M
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)].
Now, noting that for i = {l, h},
βi(t,∅, p−i) =
b(1−t)NcX
k=1
gi(k)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M +N
2
− k)].
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and omitting a very similar step we directly obtain that
(1− ph)βh(t,∅, p−h)− (1− pl)βl(t,∅, p−l) =
= −
b(1−t)NcX
k=1
[(ph − pl)glh(k − 1)][F (
M +N
2
)− F (M +N
2
− k)]
which, since dtNe + b(1− t)Nc = N, relabeling the counter in the summation
becomes:
(1− ph)βh(t,∅, p−h)− (1− pl)βl(t,∅, p−l) =
= −
N
2 −1X
k=dtNe−N2
[(ph − pl)glh(
N
2
− k − 1)][F (M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k)].
By Assumption 1,
F (
M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k) = F (
M
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1),
it follows
(1− ph)βh(t,∅, p−h) + ph ∗ αh(t,∅, p−h)− (1− pl)βl(t,∅, p−l)− pl ∗ αl(t,∅, p−l) =
=
N
2 −1X
k=dtNe−N2
[(ph − pl)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k)][glh(
N
2
+ k)− glh(
N
2
− k − 1)]
which is positive by Assumption 2.
Step 2:
Noting that for i = {l, h},
αi(∅, t, p−i) =
b(1−t)Nc−1X
k=0
gi(k)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M +N
2
− k − 1)] and
βi(∅, t, p−i) =
NX
k=dtNe+1
gi(k)[F (
M +N
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
− 1)],
and repeating the same steps as in Step 1, we get:
ph∗αh(∅, t, p−h)−pl∗αl(∅, t, p−l) =
b(1−t)Nc−1X
k=0
[(ph−pl)glh(k)][F (
M +N
2
)−F (M +N
2
−k−1)]
which relabeling the counter in the summation becomes:
ph∗αh(∅, t, p−h)−pl∗αl(∅, t, p−l) =
N
2 −1X
k=dtNe−N2
[(ph−pl)glh(
N
2
−k−1)][F (M +N
2
)−F (M
2
+k)]
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and
(1− ph)βh(∅, t, p−h)− (1− pl)βl(∅, t, p−l) =
= −
NX
k=dtNe+1
[(ph − pl)glh(k − 1)][F (
M +N
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
− 1)]
which, relabeling once again, becomes
(1− ph)βh(∅, t, p−h)− (1− pl)βl(∅, t, p−l) =
= −
N
2 −1X
k=dtNe−N2
[(ph − pl)glh(
N
2
+ k)][F (
M
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)].
Therefore,
−(1− ph)βh(∅, t, p−h)− ph ∗ ah(∅, t, p−h) + (1− pl)βl(∅, t, p−l) + pl ∗ αl(∅, t, p−l) =
N
2 −1X
k=dtNe−N2
[(ph − pl)[F (
M
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)][glh(
N
2
+ k)− glh(
N
2
− k − 1)]
which is also positive by Assumption 2.
It follows that EUh[t]−EUh[∅]− (EUl[t]−EUl[∅]) ≥ 0.
6.4 Proposition 3:
Proof. By Lemma 1, member l is indiﬀerent between a voting bloc with super-
majority t or a voting bloc with unanimity (identical to no voting bloc) if:
pt,∅l (p−l) =
βl(∅ ,t,p−l)−βl(t,∅ ,p−l)
αl(t,∅ ,p−l)−al(∅ ,t,p−l)+βl(∅ ,t,p−l)−βl(t,∅ ,p−l)
,
where:
αl(t,∅, p−l) =
N−1X
k=dtNe
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)];
βl(t,∅, p−l) =
b(1−t)NcX
k=1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M +N
2
− k)];
al(∅, t, p−l) =
b(1−t)Nc−1X
k=0
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M +N
2
− k − 1)]
and βl(∅, t, p−l) =
NX
k=dtNe+1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
− 1)].
The derivative with respect to pl of the surplus for member l generated by the
voting bloc with internal voting rule t is equal to the denominator of pt,∅l (p−l),
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which relabeling the counter in the four summations in the denominator, is
equal to:
N
2 −1X
k=dtNe−N2
gl(
N
2
+ k)[F (
M
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)]
−
N/2X
k=dtNe−N2
gl(
N
2
− k)[F (M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k)]
+
N/2X
k=dtNe−N2 +1
gl(
N
2
+ k)[F (
M
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
− 1)]
−
N/2X
k=dtNe−N2 +1
gl(
N
2
− k)[F (M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k − 1)]
=
N/2X
k=dtNe−N2 +1
gl(
N
2
+ k)[F (
M
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
− 1) + F (M
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)]
+gl(dtNe)[F (M +N
2
− 1− dtNe)− F (M −N
2
− 1)
−
N/2X
k=dtNe−N2 +1
gl(
N
2
− k)[F (M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k − 1) + F (M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k)]
−gl(N − dtNe)[F (M +N
2
)− F (M −N
2
+ dtNe)].
then note that, by assumption,
F (
M
2
− k − 1) = 1− F (M
2
+ k);F (
M
2
− k) = 1− F (M
2
+ k − 1)
and 2F (M−N2 − 1) = 2− 2F (
M+N
2 ).
Substitute accordingly to get:
N/2X
k=dtNe−N2 +1
[gl(
N
2
+ k)− gl(
N
2
− k)][2F (M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k)− F (M
2
+ k − 1)]
+gl(dtNe)[
N−1−dtNeX
k=0
gl(
M −N
2
+ k)]− gl(b(1− t)Nc)
NX
k=dtNe+1
f(
M −N
2
+ k) =
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=N/2X
k=dtNe−N2 +1
[gl(
N
2
+ k)− gl(
N
2
− k)][2F (M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k)− F (M
2
+ k − 1)]
+[gl(dtNe)− gl(b(1− t)Nc)]
N−1−dtNeX
k=0
f(
M −N
2
+ k)
Since dtNe + b(1− t)Nc = N and t ≥ 12 , if follows gl(dtNe) > gl(b(1− t)Nc)
and thus the denominator is positive.
Therefore,
EUl[t]−EUl[∅] > 0⇐⇒ pl > pt,∅l .
Then, by Lemma 2, EUl[t] − EUl[∅] > 0 =⇒ EUi[t] − EUi[∅] > 0 for all
i ∈ C.
As a corollary note, if the internal voting rule is simple majority, then dtNe =
(1 − t)N = N2 , [gl(dtNe) − gl(b(1− t)Nc)] = 0 and the threshold pt,∅l (p−l)
simplifies to:
pSm,∅l (p−l) =
NP
k=N2 +1
gl(k)[F (M+N2 − k)− F (
M−N
2 − 1)]−
N/2P
k=1
gl(k)[F (M+N2 )− F (
M+N
2 − k)]
N/2P
k=1
[gl(N2 + k)− gl(
N
2 − k)] ∗ [2F (
M+N
2 )− F (
M
2 + k)− F (
M
2 + k − 1)]
.
6.5 Proposition 4:
Let simple majority be the general election rule. Then the formation of a voting
bloc by the coalition with t as the internal decision rule benefits member l ∈ C
if and only if pl > p
t,∅
l (p−l).
Let V t ⊂ V be the subset of type profiles such that a t − majority rule
Pareto-dominates unanimity and let t0 = t+ 1N+1 .
WTS: For any t ∈ [12 ,
N−1
N+1 ), V
t is strictly contained in V t
0
.
Proof. V t = {−→p ∈ <N+M : A1, A2 hold and pl > pt,∅l (p−l)}.
V t
0
= {−→p ∈ <N+M : A1, A2 hold and pl > pt+
1
N+1 ,∅
l (p−l)}.
It suﬃces to show that pt,∅l (p−l) > p
t+ 1N+1 ,∅
l (p−l) for any p−l.
Suppose pl = p
t,∅
l (p−l). Then EUl[t]−EUl[∅] = 0
Let Sl|k denote the probability that member l is in the majority of the
coalition, given that the minority is of size k and let sl|k = 1− Sl|k denote the
probability that member l is in the minority of the coalition, given that the
minority is of size k. Then EUl[t]−EUl[∅] =
b(1−t)NcX
k=1
(Sl|k−sl|k)prob[Minority size = k]prob[rolling k votes alters outcome].
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Note that Sl|k − sl|k is decreasing in k. The bigger the minority, the more
likely l is in it. Then, EUl[t]−EUl[∅] = 0 implies that for k = b(1− t)Nc > 1,
(Sl|k − sl|k) < 0. Then:
b(1−t)Nc−1X
k=1
(Sl|k−sl|k)prob[Minority size = k]prob[rolling k votes alters outcome] > 0.
But
b(1−t)Nc−1X
k=1
(Sl|k−sl|k)prob[Minority size = k]prob[rolling k votes alters outcome]
is equal to EUl[t0]−EUl[∅], so pl > pt
0,∅
l (p−l).
6.6 Proposition 5:
Proof. Let M be fixed. Let all the N members in C\{l} have a common type
r. Then:
EUl[Sm]−EU [∅] = p
M
2 −1X
k=0
gl(
N
2
+ k)F (
M
2
− k − 1) + (1− p)
M
2 −1X
k=0
gl(
N
2
− k)[1− F (M
2
+ k)]
−p
M
2 −1X
k=0
gl(
N
2
− k − 1)[1− F (M
2
+ k)]− (1− p)
M
2 −1X
k=0
gl(
N
2
+ k + 1)[F (
M
2
− k − 1)]
Since F (M2 − k − 1) = [1− F (
M
2 + k)], this is equal to:
M
2 −1X
k=0
N !
(N2 − k)!(
N
2 + k)!
[p ∗ rN2 +k(1− r)N2 −k + (1− p)rN2 −k(1− r)N2 +k]F (M
2
− k − 1)
−
M
2 −1X
k=0
N !
(N2 − k − 1)!(
N
2 + k + 1)!
[p ∗ rN2 −k−1(1− r)
N
2
+k+1
+(1− p)rN2 +k+1(1− r)
N
2
−k−1
[F (
M
2
− k − 1)].
Equating to zero and simplifying:
M
2 −1X
k=0
p{ 1
N − 2k [r
2k+1(1− r)− r(1− r)2k+1]− 1
N + 2k + 2
[(1− r)2k+2 − r2k+2 ]}
=
M
2 −1X
k=0
(
r
2k+2
N + 2k + 2
− (1− r)
2k+1
N − 2k )
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Now we break this equation into M2 diﬀerent equations, imposing that for each
k ∈ {0, M2 − 1},
p{ 1
N − 2k [r
2k+1(1− r)− r(1− r)2k+1]− 1
N + 2k + 2
[(1− r)2k+2 − r2k+2 ]}
= (
r
2k+2
N + 2k + 2
− (1− r)
2k+1
N − 2k )
A solution to this system of equations (with just one unknown) also solves the
original equation. For each individual equation:
p =
(N − 2k)r2k+2 − (N + 2k + 2)r(1− r)2k+1
r(1− r)[r2k − (1− r)2k](N + 2k + 2)− (N − 2k)[(1− r)2k+2 − r2k+2 ]
which, as N −→∞, converges to
r2k+2 − r(1− r)2k+1
r2k+1(1− r)− r(1− r)2k+1 − (1− r)2k+2 + r2k+2
= r
So lim
N−−>∞
pSm,∅l (p−l) = r. Since by assumption pl < r, this implies that for N
large enough, pl < p
Sm,∅
l (p−l) and then member l would be hurt if C forms a
voting bloc with simple majority.
6.7 Proposition 6:
Proof. Let Out denote the internal voting rule for the coalition under which
N members form a voting bloc with simple majority and member l stays out of
the bloc and does not pool her vote with the rest of the coalition. By Lemma 1
member l is indiﬀerent between rules Out and ∅ if:
pOut,∅l (p−l) =
βl(∅ ,Out,p−l)−βl(Out,∅ ,p−l)
αl(Out,∅ ,p−l)−αl(∅ ,Out,p−l)+βl(∅ ,Out,p−l)−βl(Out,∅ ,p−l)
, where:
αl(Out,∅, p−l) =
N−1X
k=N2 +1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)];
βl(Out,∅, p−l) =
N
2 −1X
k=1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M +N
2
− k)];
αl(∅, Out, p−l) =
N
2 −1X
k=1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
− 1)− F (M +N
2
− k − 1)]
and βl(∅, Out, p−l) =
N−1X
k=N2 +1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
)].
Relabeling the counters in the summations, we can write the denominator
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αl(Out,∅, p−l)− αl(∅, Out, p−l) + βl(∅, Out, p−l)− βl(Out,∅, p−l) as:
N
2 −1X
k=1
gl(
N
2
+ k)[F (
M
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)]
−
N
2 −1X
k=1
gl(
N
2
− k)[F (M +N
2
− 1)− F (M
2
+ k − 1)]
+
N
2 −1X
k=1
gl(
N
2
+ k)[F (
M
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
)]−
N
2 −1X
k=1
gl(
N
2
− k)[F (M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k)].
Since
[F (
M
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
) + F (
M
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)] =
[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M
2
+ k) + F (
M +N
2
− 1)− F (M
2
+ k − 1)],
the denominator simplifies to
N
2 −1X
k=1
[gl(
N
2
+k)−gl(
N
2
−k)][F (M
2
−k)−F (M −N
2
)+F (
M
2
−k−1)−F (M −N
2
−1)]
and pOut,∅l (p−l) =
P N
2
−1
k=1 {gl(N2 +k)[F (M2 −k)−F (M−N2 )]−gl(N2 −k)[F (M+N2 )−F (M2 +k)]}P N
2
−1
k=1 [gl(
N
2 +k)−gl(
N
2 −k)][F (
M
2 −k)−F (
M−N
2 )+F (
M
2 −k−1)−F (
M−N
2 −1)]
.
The diﬀerence in utility for agent l between the formation of a bloc without
l and no bloc at all is
EUl[Out]−EUl[∅] =
= pl[αl(Out,∅, p−l)− αl(∅, Out, p−l)] + (1− pl)[βl(Out,∅, p−l)− βl(∅, Out, p−l)].
The derivative of EUl[Out] − EUl[∅] with respect to pl coincides with the de-
nominator of the threshold pOut,∅l (p−l), which is positive. Therefore, for pl above
the threshold pOut,∅l (p−l), member l prefers the formation of a voting bloc in
which l does not participate better than not forming any bloc at all; whereas
for pl below p
Out,∅
l (p−l), member l prefers to form no bloc than to form a bloc
in which l does not participate.
6.8 Proposition 7:
Let V be the set of type profiles (p1, p2, ..., pN+M+1) satisfying Assumptions 1
and 2. Let V t ⊂ V be the subset of type profiles such that a t − majority
rule Pareto-dominates unanimity for C, let (V t)C be its complement such that
V t ∪ (V t)C ≡ V and let V Out ⊂ V be the subset of type profiles such that an
"Opt-Out for l" rule Pareto dominates unanimity for C. Then, for any M and
for any 4 ≤ N ≤M, (V t)C ∩ V Out is not empty.
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Proof. Suppose 4 ≤ N ≤M, pl = (1− δ) and pj = (1− ε) ∀j ∈ C\{l}. Then:
EUl[Out]−EUl[∅] = (1− δ)
N−1X
k=dt(N−1)e+1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
− k − 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)]
+δ
b(1−t)(N−1)cX
k=1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M +N
2
− k)]
−(1− δ)
b(1−t)(N−1)cX
k=1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
− 1)− F (M +N
2
− k − 1)]
−δ
N−1X
k=dt(N−1)e+1
gl(k)[F (
M +N
2
− k)− F (M −N
2
)].
As ε converges to zero, gl(k)gl(N−1) converges to zero for any k < N − 1 and
EUl[Out]−EUl[∅] converges to:
(1−δ)gl(N−1)[F (M−N2 )−F (
M−N
2 −1)]−δgl(N−1)[F (
M−N
2 +1)−F (
M−N
2 )]
which is positive for a suﬃciently low δ, provided that f(M−N2 ) > 0.
Then, there exist a δ > 0 and ε > 0 such that for all ε < ε, EUl[Out] −
EUl[∅] > 0.
Therefore, if 4 ≤ N ≤M, and the types of all the members but l converge
to 1, member l with type pl = (1 − δ) will benefit from a voting bloc with an
"Opt-Out for l" rule. Given that all the other members of C share a common
type, they would all benefit from forming a voting bloc without l. Since pt,∅l (p−l)
converges to 1, member l would not benefit from a t−majority internal voting
rule in a voting bloc that includes every member. It follows that if ε < ε, any
profile of types in which pl = (1 − δ) and pj = (1 − ε) ∀j ∈ C\{l} is in V Out
but not in V t, thus V Out * V t.
If N > M, then EUl[Sm]−EUl[Out] = 2gl(N2 )[F (
M+N
2 )−F (
M
2 )] > 0, thus
thus V Out ⊂ V Sm. If N = 2, then Out coincides with ∅ and V Out is empty.
6.9 Proposition 8:
Proof. By Lemma 1, member l will be indiﬀerent between participating in the
voting bloc or opting out if
pSm,Outl (p−l) =
βl(Out,Sm,p−l)−βl(Sm,Out,p−l)
αl(Sm,Out,p−l)−αl(Out,Sm,p−l)+βl(Out,Sm,p−l)−βl(Sm,Out,p−l)
,
where:
αl(Sm,Out, p−l) = gl(N2 )[F (
M
2 − 1) − F (
M−N
2 − 1)]; βl(Sm,Out, p−l) =
gl(N2 )[F (
M+N
2 )−F (
M
2 )]; αl(Out, Sm, p−l) =
PN
2 −1
k=0 gl(k)f(
M+N
2 ); βl(Out, Sm, p−l) =PN
k=N2 +1
g(k)f(M−N2 ).
Since F (M2 −1)−F (
M−N
2 −1) = F (
M+N
2 )−F (
M
2 ) and f(
M+N
2 ) = f(
M−N
2 )
it follows that αl(Sm,Out, p−l) = βl(Sm,Out, p−l) and we can simplify the
32
denominator to αl(Out, Sm, p−l)− βl(Out, Sm, p−l) =
[
NX
k=N2 +1
g(k)−
N
2 −1X
k=0
gl(k)]f(
M +N
2
) =
N/2X
k=1
[gl(
N
2
+ k)− gl(
N
2
− k)]f(M +N
2
)
and pSm,Outl (p−l) =
PN
k=N
2
+1
g(k)f(M−N2 )−gl(
N
2 )[F (
M+N
2 )−F (
M
2 )]PN/2
k=1[gl(
N
2 +k)−gl(N2 −k)]f(
M+N
2 )
.
The advantage for member l of staying in, EUl[Sm]−EUl[Out] =
= pl[αl(Sm,Out, p−l)−al(Out, Sm, p−l)]+(1−pl)[βl(sm,Out, p−l)−βl(Out, Sm, p−l)].
Its derivative with respect to pl coincides with the denominator of p
Sm,Out
l (p−l).
Since gl(N2 + k) > gl(
N
2 − k) for all k ∈ [1,
N
2 ], the denominator and thus the
derivative are positive. Therefore, member l prefers to stay in if type pl is above
the threshold pSm,Outl (p−l) and member l prefers to opt-out than to stay in if
pl < p
Sm,Out
l (p−l).
6.10 Proposition 9:
Proof. The first statement comes straightforward from Propositions 3 and 8.
For the second one, suppose pi = p ∀i ∈ C. Then all members benefit from the
formation of a voting bloc with simple majority: EUi[Sm] > EUi[∅] ∀i ∈ C.
The extra gains of stepping out for member l when simple majority is the general
voting rule are:
EUl[Out]−EUl[Sm] = p
N
2 −1X
k=0
gl(k)f(
M +N
2
) + (1− p)
NX
k=N2 +1
gl(k)f(
M −N
2
)
−pgl(
N
2
)[F (
M
2
− 1)− F (M −N
2
− 1)]− (1− p)gl(
N
2
)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M
2
)]
For p ∈ (1/2, 1) and any N,M :
EUl[Out]−EUl[Sm] > (1− p)
NX
k=N2 +1
gl(k)f(
M −N
2
)− gl(
N
2
)[F (
M +N
2
)− F (M
2
)]
> (1− p)f(M −N
2
)gl(N)−
1
2
gl(
N
2
),
which letting α = f(M−N2 ) and β =
N !
N
2 !
N
2 !
is equal to:
α(1− p)pN − 12βpN/2(1− p)N/2 = (1− p)pN/2[αpN/2−
1
2β(1− p)
N−2
2 ], which
is positive if and only if
2αpN/2 ≥ β(1− p)N−22 ⇐⇒ p
N/2
(1− p)N−22
≥ β
2α
⇐⇒ p
(1− p)N−2N
≥
µ
β
2α
¶2/N
.
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Letting γ > 0 be any number such that p ≥ γ, this last inequality will be
satisfied if
γ
(1− p)N−2N
≥
µ
β
2α
¶2/N
⇐⇒ (1− p)
N−2
N ≤ γ
µ
2α
β
¶2/N
⇐⇒ (1− p) ≤ γ
µ
2α
β
¶ 2
N−2
⇐⇒ p ≥ 1− γ
µ
2α
β
¶ 2
N−2
,
which is less than one for N ∈ [4,M ], provided that f(M−N2 ) > 0.
Note that if N = 2, then
³
2α
β
´ 2
N−2
= 0; whereas if N > M, α = 0.
If N = 2, then EUl[Out] = EUl[∅], thus EUl[Sm] > EUl[∅] implies
EUl[Sm] > EUl[Out].
If N > M, then f(M+N2 ) = f(
M−N
2 ) = 0, thus
EUl[Out]−EUl[Sm] = −pgl(
N
2
)F (
M
2
− 1)− (1− p)gl(
N
2
)[1− F (M
2
)] < 0.
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